In the previous article (Part 1/2), the focus was on Game 2 of the World Series: how the Dodgers and Blue Jays built their lineups, how the starting pitchers performed, and how each bullpen was managed and executed.

In this part (Part 2/2), the analysis turns to three on-field dimensions — offense, baserunning, and defense — followed by a look at each coaching staff’s in-game adjustments and tactical decisions. The final sections preview the projected Game 3 starters and possible lineup adjustments, then close with an overall summary and what this series now looks like going forward.

5️⃣ Offensive performance by both lineups
《Dodgers — Offense》

(Dodgers’ starting order in this game)

In this game, the Dodgers’ starting lineup was almost identical to their Game 1 lineup. That was not accidental.

First, Toronto’s Game 2 starter Kevin Gausman, like Game 1 starter Trey Yesavage, is a right-hander. The Dodgers’ staff chose to stick with essentially the same “vs RHP” configuration to keep continuity.

Second, there’s a defensive balance component. For example, Andy Pages remained in the No. 9 spot despite his slow postseason bat, because his range and arm in the outfield are valuable. That shows the Dodgers’ staff choosing “stability and overall balance” over hyper-reactive changes.

Even though the Dodgers’ offense looked out of sync in Game 1, the staff clearly treated that more as an off night than a structural flaw. Carrying the same core lineup into Game 2 signals confidence that the group still has enough firepower and just needed timing and execution to click again.

(How the Dodgers’ bats produced in this game)

The Dodgers collected only 6 hits in this game — and still scored 5 runs, showing very high efficiency.

Top 1st: Freddie Freeman lined a double to right field, and Will Smith followed with a ground-ball single back through the middle to drive him in. The Dodgers jumped ahead 1–0, immediately getting production from the middle of the order.

The game then tightened until the top of the 7th, when the Dodgers finally broke it open. Will Smith turned on an elevated fastball from Kevin Gausman and launched a solo homer to straightaway center, making it 2–1. Right after that, Max Muncy followed with a solo homer to left, stretching the lead to 3–1 and flipping momentum.

In the top of the 8th, the Dodgers kept pressing. Against a shaky Blue Jays bullpen sequence, they added insurance on a wild pitch and then a bases-loaded ground ball by Will Smith to short. Shortstop Andrés Giménez tried to start a double play by going to second first, but the Dodgers beat the back end. Two more runs scored, pushing it to 5–1.

With runners in scoring position, the Dodgers had 3 RISP at-bats total: 1 hit (the first-inning RBI single by Will Smith), and 4 men left on. On paper that looks ordinary, but in context the Dodgers were extremely timely.

Across nine offensive half-innings, the Dodgers went down 1-2-3 in five of them. But in the other four, they scored in three different innings. The two solo homers in the 7th and the add-on runs in the 8th let them completely control the late game.

All of this paired with Yoshinobu Yamamoto’s dominant start — he threw a complete game, allowed just one run — and the Dodgers executed a classic postseason win script: elite starting pitching plus a few high-impact swings. They won 5–1, tied the series, and grabbed a major emotional/psychological boost heading into the next game.

Looking at advanced data, the Dodgers’ offense was actually even more about impact than volume.
According to Statcast, the Dodgers’ xBA (expected batting average) in this game was just .189, lower than Toronto’s .255. Their overall hard-hit rate (Hard Hit%) was 40.7%, slightly below Toronto’s 41.7%. On averages alone, it doesn’t look like L.A. “hit better.”

But impact matters. The Dodgers generated 11 hard-hit balls, compared to Toronto’s 10. And out of L.A.’s 6 total hits, 3 were extra-base hits (two solo homers and one double). By contrast, Toronto managed only 4 total hits all game, and only one went for extra bases (George Springer’s double).

That contrast is the story: the Dodgers converted their best contact into damage. Even if the Blue Jays sometimes hit the ball hard, the Dodgers were the ones actually cashing in with game-changing swings.

Also important: in the top of the 8th, the Dodgers punished Louis Varland’s loss of command when he tried to work a second inning. They drew two walks, created a bases-loaded situation, and even without a classic “RBI single with RISP,” they manufactured two insurance runs through pressure, patience, and contact-in-play. That’s disciplined situational offense.

Overall, the Dodgers reached base 9 times (6 hits + 3 walks), and struck out only 7 times. Their strikeout rate (19.4%) was way down from Game 1 (34.2%), suggesting much better adjustment to Toronto’s pitch mix and sequencing.

Six of the nine Dodgers starters reached at least once. The core was especially active:

Freddie Freeman (3rd), Will Smith (4th), and Max Muncy (6th) each reached twice and drove key moments while hitting near one another in the order.

Will Smith was the offensive centerpiece: 3 RBI total (RBI single in the 1st, solo HR in the 7th, RBI grounder in the 8th).

Max Muncy added his solo homer for 1 RBI.

In short: this wasn’t a “15-hit outburst.” It was targeted, patient, and brutal when it counted — exactly what a team needs in a tight, starting-pitcher-driven game.

《Blue Jays — Offense》

(Blue Jays’ starting order in this game)

Toronto made large structural changes from Game 1 to Game 2. Aside from George Springer still leading off, Vladimir Guerrero Jr. still batting third, and Andrés Giménez still in the nine-hole, the other six lineup spots all moved.

With Bo Bichette unavailable (still not fully healthy), the Jays moved what had been their 5–6–7 group from Game 1 up into the 4–5–6 slots here to keep some middle-order stability. Meanwhile, the two right-handed outfielders who had started in Game 1 — No. 2 hitter Davis Schneider and No. 8 hitter Myles Straw — did not start in Game 2.

Instead, Toronto brought in two left-handed bats: Nathan Lukes hit second and started in LF, and Addison Barger started in RF hitting seventh. They also inserted Isiah Kiner-Falefa (IKF) into the lineup hitting eighth at second base, adding infield flexibility and small-ball options.

Overall, this was not just mixing things up for its own sake. It was clearly aimed at attacking the Dodgers’ right-handed starter, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, by offering alternating looks and trying to disrupt his rhythm.

(How the Blue Jays’ bats produced in this game)

Even though this lineup actually looked closer to Toronto’s “standard postseason” core (ALDS / ALCS usage) than Game 1’s particular setup, the Jays’ offense was largely shut down. They managed just 4 hits and scored only 1 run — and that one run came on a sacrifice fly by Daulton Varsho in the bottom of the 2nd.

In Game 1, Toronto was lethal with runners in scoring position (5 AB, 3 H with RISP). In Game 2, that dropped to 4 AB, 1 H with RISP — not terrible statistically, but that lone hit didn’t drive in a run. In other words, they had traffic but never delivered the one swing to flip the inning.

They stranded 4 runners, mostly early:

Bottom 1st: runners on first and third, nobody out … but no run scored (2 LOB).

Bottom 2nd and Bottom 3rd: 1 stranded each.

From the 4th inning onward, they had zero baserunners the rest of the game.

That last point matters: once Yamamoto settled, Toronto never generated a second wave. Their offense was basically shut down from the 4th inning through the 9th.

Interestingly, Toronto’s xBA (.255) was higher than the Dodgers’ (.189), and their hard-hit rate (41.7%) was actually a touch higher than L.A.’s (40.7%). On paper that suggests: “the Jays hit the ball just fine.” But results told a different story.

Many of the Jays’ better swings died in gloves. Meanwhile the Dodgers’ best contact turned into loud extra-base hits, including the solo homers by Will Smith and Max Muncy. Toronto hit zero home runs in this game — a sharp contrast to Game 1 — and that power gap was decisive.

Plate discipline was also very different from Game 1. In Game 1, the Blue Jays struck out just 4 times and drew 4 walks — a great balance. In Game 2, Yamamoto’s pitch mix and command locked them down: Toronto struck out 8 times and drew zero walks.

The Blue Jays reached base only 5 times total (versus 9 for the Dodgers), and all of that traffic was in the first three innings. Specifically:

George Springer reached twice (one double and one hit-by-pitch) and was the only Blue Jay to get on base twice.

Nathan Lukes and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. each picked up one hit.

Ernie Clement also logged a hit, but it was essentially a towering infield pop-up that dropped. Statcast gave it an xBA of 0.000, and some fans argued it should’ve been ruled an error instead of a hit.

So Toronto was not hopelessly overmatched in pure contact quality, but: no long ball, no walk pressure, no second-wave rally. Once Yamamoto took control, the offense had no way to re-open the game.

6️⃣ Baserunning

Across 18 total offensive half-innings (top 1st through bottom 9th), only 7 half-innings featured baserunners at all — 4 for the Dodgers and 3 for the Blue Jays.

From the 2nd through the 6th, the Dodgers didn’t get a single baserunner. From the 4th through the 9th, the Blue Jays didn’t get a single baserunner against Yamamoto. That tells you how compressed this game was: very few chances to apply pressure on the bases.

Toronto in particular ran conservatively. In several situations, they chose controlled advancement instead of high-risk aggression — in part because the Dodgers’ outfield, especially Kiké Hernández in left, repeatedly cut balls off quickly and fired in accurate throws. That forced the Jays’ staff to think twice about forcing the issue.

The clearest example came in the bottom of the 1st. With nobody out and George Springer on second, Nathan Lukes lined a single to left. Kiké Hernández was playing fairly shallow, got the ball on one hop, and immediately fired in. Max Muncy quickly moved to cut off the lane between third and home. Springer held at third.

That decision, while cautious, was reasonable. Springer’s sprint speed this season (Sprint Speed PR 66, roughly upper-middle tier) is good but not elite, and forcing that run at the plate with 0 outs would have been risky. The Jays had first and third, nobody out, and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. coming up scorching hot. From a game theory standpoint, keeping the inning alive for the heart of the order was sensible — even if, in the end, they still didn’t cash it in.

In the bottom of the 3rd, Toronto showed that same calculation. With one out and Springer on first, Guerrero Jr. absolutely smoked an inside four-seam fastball from Yamamoto: 113.9 mph exit velo, 19° launch angle, 341 feet to left. Off the bat it looked like at least a double off the wall.

But Kiké Hernández anticipated the carom, shaded deep, played it almost off the wall on a short hop, and came up firing to second immediately. The throw angle and timing essentially froze Guerrero Jr., whose sprint speed (PR 35) is not exactly elite. He prudently stayed at first.

Again, it looks passive, but in that situation it was smart. The Jays already had traffic, and Alejandro Kirk was hitting well behind him. Guerrero Jr. prioritized keeping the inning alive instead of getting thrown out at second in a bang-bang play. Kirk’s sac fly later in that frame tied the game. Even though Daulton Varsho eventually made the third out, if Guerrero Jr. had forced a risky stretch into a double and been thrown out, that entire rally might have died on the spot.

So while it wasn’t flashy baserunning, it was situationally intelligent baserunning — showing Toronto’s awareness of risk in a tight, low-scoring game and respect for the Dodgers’ outfield arms.

On the Dodgers’ side, the top of the 8th was a great example of execution and detail. With one out and the bases loaded, Will Smith hit a slow roller toward short on a 2-1 count. The ball left the bat at just 65.2 mph — soft and slow.

Shortstop Andrés Giménez charged, flipped to Bo Bichette covering second (Bichette had entered in the 7th for Isiah Kiner-Falefa), and Bichette tried to turn two. The feeds were clean, but just a beat late.

Two things decided it:

The slow speed of the grounder forced the infielders to waste fractions of a second adjusting their footwork.

Will Smith, whose sprint speed (PR 46) is only slightly below average for MLB position players, absolutely sold out down the line like a non-catcher.

Result: Toronto only got the force at second. The Dodgers avoided the inning-ending double play, another run scored, and the lead stretched to 5–1.

That run looked like “just insurance,” but it was actually a snapshot of the entire game: the Dodgers squeezing value out of every micro-window, and Toronto just a half-step late in the margins.

7️⃣ Defense

Defensively, both teams were steady. Neither team committed an error in this game, and through two World Series games, both clubs still sit at zero errors. That speaks to focus and execution under World Series pressure.

The Dodgers were especially sharp. Even though Toronto posted a higher xBA (.255 vs .189), the Jays wound up with only 4 hits while the Dodgers had 6. That reflects how efficiently the Dodgers converted hard contact into outs. A lot of Toronto’s “that looks like a hit off the bat” swings were erased.

One standout play came in the bottom of the 9th. Alejandro Kirk ripped a liner to center (101.0 mph exit velo, 317 feet, xBA .590). Justin Dean — who had entered in the 9th to play center, with Andy Pages sliding over to right — read it perfectly off the bat, got a great first step, and ran it down before it could land. That robbed what was, by expected metrics, more than a coin-flip base hit. With Yamamoto already into the 9th and fatigue a factor, that catch helped preserve the complete game and locked in the game’s pace.

Kiké Hernández was also a recurring theme. Even when he didn’t get an outfield assist on the stat sheet, his positioning, jumps, and quick throws discouraged the Jays from taking extra bases in the 1st and 3rd innings. That suppressed Toronto’s ability to “manufacture chaos.”

There was one odd sequence in the bottom of the 2nd. Ernie Clement hit a towering infield pop-up. The ball went so high that the white roof at Rogers Centre seemed to interfere with Freddie Freeman’s read at first base. Freeman got leather on it late, but it fell in. The official scorer ruled it a hit, in part because there wasn’t a clean, obvious “boot,” and in part because the ceiling glare likely disrupted the play. It was one of the few moments where the Dodgers’ defense looked even slightly shaky.

On Toronto’s side, Kevin Gausman struck out 6 in 6 2/3 innings. Even though the Dodgers produced 9 hard-hit balls off him, Toronto’s positioning and routine handling helped hold things together for most of the night. No spectacular highlight-reel web gem, but solid, professional run prevention around their ace.

However, when Louis Varland came in for the 8th, some cracks showed. His command wobbled across innings, and Alejandro Kirk had trouble blocking a pitch in the dirt. With the bases loaded, Varland spiked a breaking ball, Kirk tried to bare-hand it instead of body-blocking, and it skipped away. Andy Pages scored, making it 4–1. If that ball is blocked, Toronto still has a shot at a double-play escape. Instead, it turned into a free run.

Right after that, with the count 0-3, Toronto chose to intentionally walk Freddie Freeman to set up the force and hope for a double play. Will Smith then hit the slow roller discussed above. Toronto got only one out, another run scored, and it was 5–1.

So while Toronto’s defense was generally fine, the small-detail gaps in the 8th — block vs. smother, footwork timing, etc. — were enough to tilt the inning. In a World Series environment, that’s often all it takes.

8️⃣ Dugout strategy and in-game adjustments

(Dodgers coaching and tactical choices)

The Dodgers essentially duplicated their Game 1 personnel in Game 2. That shows a high level of trust: even after losing Game 1, management didn’t panic or scramble. The message was, “these are our guys for a must-have equalizer, and we believe they’ll respond.”

They scored first in the top of the 1st. They went completely silent from the 2nd through the 6th. Toronto tied it in the bottom of the 3rd. And still, the Dodgers did not abandon plan or tempo. In the 7th, Will Smith and Max Muncy’s back-to-back solo shots flipped the score to 3–1. In the 8th, they leveraged walks, pressure, and smart baserunning to extend it to 5–1. From there, the game was under full Dodger control.

On the mound, the Dodgers’ staff showed total confidence in Yoshinobu Yamamoto. After a choppy first few innings, Yamamoto locked in: after the 3rd, the Blue Jays didn’t reach base again. He finished the 8th on just 93 pitches. Given that efficiency and rhythm, the Dodgers let him go back out for the 9th to chase the complete game.

That decision wasn’t just about ego. It protected the Dodgers’ bullpen for the rest of the series. It also reflects the fact that Yamamoto has already shown, earlier this postseason (for example in NLDS Game 2 vs. Milwaukee), that he can handle full workload in high-pressure starts. He delivered another complete game win here, which is huge for Los Angeles going forward.

(Blue Jays coaching and tactical choices)

Toronto started Kevin Gausman, the same ace who anchored them through the ALDS and ALCS. In Game 1, the Jays had gone with Trey Yesavage — a less-scouted look for the Dodgers. In Game 2, they went back to the established No. 1 guy.

The lineup was reworked to attack Yamamoto: in Game 1 vs the Dodgers’ lefty ace Blake Snell, Toronto leaned heavily on right-handed bats. In Game 2 vs righty Yamamoto, they brought in more left-handed bats (Nathan Lukes, Addison Barger) and used Isiah Kiner-Falefa to add flexibility. But Yamamoto and Will Smith’s pitch calling essentially neutralized that plan. Toronto’s legitimate RISP chances were mostly in the 1st and 3rd; after that, nothing.

On the bullpen side, after Gausman gave up those two solo homers in the 7th and exited, Toronto turned to Louis Varland — a reliever they’ve trusted in this postseason. In the 8th, with one out and the bases loaded and the score still within reach, they went to Jeff Hoffman, their high-leverage arm. Even though the Jays were trailing, the logic was clear: keep the game from blowing open, stay within striking distance, and hold the door for a possible late comeback.

That tells you how the Jays view this stage: even while behind, they’re willing to use premium bullpen pieces to keep the score close instead of “saving” them. The aim is to maintain competitiveness inning by inning, not punt a game.

9️⃣ Projected Game 3 starters and likely lineup adjustments

Game 3 of the World Series is scheduled for October 28 (Tuesday), 8:00 AM Taiwan time, shifting to Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles.

The projected matchup is Max Scherzer for Toronto vs Tyler Glasnow for Los Angeles — two veteran right-handers squaring off in what’s shaping up to be a major tone-setter.

(Blue Jays’ Game 3 starter — Max Scherzer, and possible Dodger counters)

Toronto is expected to hand the ball to Max Scherzer. Now 41, Scherzer started ALCS Game 4 vs Seattle and delivered 5 2/3 innings, 3 hits, 2 earned runs — calm, controlled work.

The Jays appear to be choosing Scherzer here instead of Shane Bieber because of postseason stability and experience. Bieber’s earlier playoff outings have been more volatile. With the series tied 1–1 and Game 3 seen as a swing point, Toronto is opting for the veteran who can manage chaos and tempo.

On the Dodgers’ side, Scherzer’s platoon splits matter. This season, he allowed just a .156 average to left-handed hitters, but a .297 average to right-handed hitters — a very large split. That means the Dodgers may actually lean into their right-handed run producers in Game 3, even though, in Game 2, their core left-handed bats (Shohei Ohtani, Freddie Freeman, Max Muncy) all contributed. Based purely on matchup data, right-handed offense could be key.

One more edge for L.A.: through the first two World Series games, most of the Dodgers’ “A-tier” bullpen hasn’t had to throw heavy, so they enter Game 3 extremely fresh. That gives them a lot of flexibility once Scherzer exits.

(Dodgers’ Game 3 starter — Tyler Glasnow, and possible Blue Jays counters)

The Dodgers plan to start Tyler Glasnow — known to a lot of fans in Taiwan by the nickname “Xue-ge,” or “Brother Snow.” Through his first three postseason outings this year, Glasnow has thrown 13 1/3 innings with just 1 earned run allowed. That’s a 0.68 ERA and a .152 opponent average. He’s been on fire.

He’s also struck out 18 in those 13 1/3 innings, though he’s issued 8 walks. So while control can waver, pure stuff and whiff power are elite. Even though Toronto’s lineup doesn’t strike out excessively overall, Glasnow’s combination of velocity and breaking-ball shape is a serious threat.

Because Glasnow is a right-hander, Toronto’s Game 3 batting order will likely resemble what they rolled out in Game 2. Even though the Blue Jays’ bats were mostly quiet in G2, their overall postseason offensive profile has been fairly steady, so they may prefer continuity. The big question is Bo Bichette. He did not start in Game 2, which suggests his health remains uncertain. Whether Bichette can return to the starting lineup in Game 3 is one of the biggest lineup questions for Toronto.

🔟 Final thoughts

Game 2 looked completely different from Game 1.

Game 1 was an offense-driven, momentum-swinging slugfest.
Game 2 was a pitcher’s game — controlled pace, limited traffic, and enormous weight on every single baserunner. The series is now tied 1–1: Blue Jays took Game 1, Dodgers answered in Game 2. With the scene shifting to Los Angeles for Game 3, the tension only goes up.

One extra storyline heading into Dodger Stadium: George Springer. For Dodgers fans, Springer is still a lightning-rod name because of 2017. Back then, with Houston, Springer crushed in the World Series: .379 average, 5 home runs, 7 RBI, and the World Series MVP. But the Astros’ 2017 title was later tainted by the sign-stealing scandal, and many Dodgers fans still see that ring as illegitimate.

Now Springer is back in the World Series wearing Blue Jays colors — and the opponent, again, is the Dodgers. He’s likely to get booed loudly in Los Angeles. How he responds to that environment is already one of the big human subplots of Game 3.

That concludes this Game 2 breakdown. The next installment will cover World Series Game 3 in full detail. Stay tuned.

Sources /
Baseball Savant
MLB.com
FanGraphs
Google information